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Introduction
On 16 January 2016, all UN, EU, and US nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were lifted after the confirmation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had fulfilled its commitments of the nuclear agreement reached in (IAEA, 2016 .
This marked the 'Implementation Day' -in the agreement's parlance -of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to resolve the stand-off on the controversial Iranian nuclear programme that has bedeviled international politics ever since its discovery in 2002. The US and EU administrations initiated the lifting of sanctions specified in Annex V of the JCPOA, while relevant sanctions provisions in UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1696, 1737, 1803, 1835, 1929 and 2224 were terminated. 1 This in itself is a historic success of international diplomacy to prevent war in the Middle East, and the first successful precedent for the rewinding of UN sanctions imposed over proliferation charges without resorting to military means or regime change plans. The verified rollback of nuclear capabilities is also rare in arms-control history (Fitzpatrick, 2016) .
With nuclear-related UN-mandated sanctions and those adopted by the EU and the US administration lifted, the path is cleared for an altered engagement of Iran with the world. European businesses are eager to see the latter scenario bring renewed investment opportunities. EU High Representative Federica Mogherini travelled to Tehran in April 2016 to emphasise the importance of the speedy implementation of the JCPOA. She was accompanied by business representatives as well as seven EU commissioners, signaling a high-level interest on the part of the EU in re-entering the Iranian market. But the evolution of the EU-US dialogue on the Iranian nuclear conflict has seen the adoption of policy choices on the part of the EU that were promoted and favored by US administrations. These put the EU into an intricate position with regard to future Iran policies. Most notoriously, the extraterritorial nature of US unilateral sanctions has relegated the EU to an entity constrained in autonomous Iran policy formulation in the complex nuclear diplomacy with Iran. After 2010, in addition, the EU adopted its own Iran sanctions that were modeled on American legislation and went well beyond UN provisions. European governments have subscribed to normative readings of security that were formulated not in Europe, but in Washington. This confronts us with a paradox: Ushering in a 'new chapter' in relations with Iran that
Mogherini spoke about after the conclusion of the nuclear agreement (EEAS, 2015) will require the disentanglement of EU Iran policies from US policy preferences at a time where both the EU and the US take an active part in the implementation of the JCPOA.
This article proceeds to examine this paradox in its impact on EU foreign policy on
Iran. Doing so, it will draw on neo-Gramscian scholarship (Cox, 1981; Jones, 2006; Worth, 2009; to show how Europe faces structural constraints for any reformulation of its future Iran policies after the nuclear agreement. The article posits that conceptualisations of the EU-US security dialogue have traditionally been steeped in rationalist frameworks (Kotzias and Liacouras, 2006; Rees, 2011; Menotti and Vencato, 2008; Toje, 2008 ) that fail to account for the inherently relational aspect of international politics and the normative power of order-constituting discourses (on the latter, cf. Homolar, 2011; Hoyt, 2000; Senn, 2009) . The acceptance or rejection of a foreign policy behaviour as appropriate is the expression of security cultures. 'Security' becomes situational and is intimately and inextricably linked with images of 'Self' and 'Other'. The social construction of identities and 'order' is intimately linked with hegemonic legitimacy, and it is here that neo-Gramscian scholarship offers a useful lense to understand the intertwining of security perceptions, role expectations, and identity politics -factors in foreign policy perennially missed in realist and liberalinstitutionalist approaches. In Gramsci's understanding of hegemony, a dominant class forms a relationship with subaltern classes that is characterised both by consent and coercion (Gramsci, 1971: 55-60; 415-25) . Such an ensemble of and arrangement between hegemonic structures and the wider society represents a 'historic bloc'. In a neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony in International Relations as developed, e.g., in Cox's seminal works on World Order (Cox, 1996: 131) , the prevalence of dominant structures that are accepted and sustained by a sufficiently large number of other actors (states) can also constitute such a 'historic bloc'. Force and coercion, Gramsci has further theorised, can never alone sustain a historic bloc, but must be complemented by a level of (tacit) consent between hegemonic structures and subalterns. In International Relations Theories, this nuances the idea that hegemony is necessarily an endeavor driven by a dominant state in that the interactions between the forces of consent and coercion and between different levels collectively serve to perpetuate hegemonic structures. Rather than conceiving of the mechanisms of hegemony as one-dimensional economic coercion, this dual face of dominance helps us understand how hegemony establishes itself also on an ideational level. This article will demonstrate how such a neo-Gramscian conceptualisation can fruitfully be applied to the EU-US dialogue on Iran and tensions over diverging priorities in the implementation of the JCPOA. It will be shown how neo-Gramscian scholarship offers an under-utilised conceptual angle to US-EU relations in general, and how the Iran case serves as an illustrative application in particular for a Gramscian conception of hegemony in international relations. Such an approach has never been used to analyse the US-EU dialogue on Iran before. The implementation of the nuclear agreement can entail a European emancipation from a hegemonic narrative that has been woven over decades of institutionalised enmity. While 'emancipation' has become somewhat of a buzzword in Critical Theories, it is here defined as the contestation of such dominant narratives and their policy implications (e.g. extraterritorial sanctions) that allows for the formulation of autonomous policies. In other words, it captures the extent of agency of the EU.
The article proceeds as follow. A first section briefly process-traces the evolution of the EU as an actor and mediator in Iran diplomacy, and how the transatlantic dialogue on the Iran nuclear case unfolded. Process-tracing is used here in its outcome-oriented variant that aims to understand decisional processes (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 3) . A second section then illustrates how US financial and structural power has meant that the United States would become the single most influential actor in not only shaping the Iran nuclear talks, but in setting the tone for the transatlantic dialogue on Iran as well. It will be shown how the EU has responded by 'overcomplying' with US policy preferences in general, and US unilateral Iran sanctions in particular. A third section outlines the potential and risks associated with the implementation of the nuclear agreement reached on 14 July 2015 with regard to the transatlantic dialogue on Iran. European emancipation in its Iran policies, it will be shown, is conditioned on the faithful implementation of the deal and the crafting of genuine European policies on Iran and the Middle East. The research methods used are qualitative document analysis and process-tracing, complemented by semi-structured elite interviews that were conducted for the purpose of this study. Interviewees included current and former officials with expert knowledge of the EU and US Iran policy decision-making processes.
European Iran Diplomacy: From Resistance to Subaltern Relegation
In the absence of US-Iranian bilateral relations, it fell to the 'E3' (i.e. France, United
Kingdom and Germany) to lead negotiations with Iran when the latter's nuclear programme was uncovered in 2002. The choice was arbitrary and reflected a traditional understanding of the weight of the 'Big Three' in intra-EU power arrangements (Patrikarakos, 2012: 196 The diplomatic track record of the E3 in negotiations after 2003 concerning the Iranian nuclear programme has been widely analysed in the scholarly literature as well as in memoirs and biographies of decision-makers. 4 The aim here is thus not to revisit the evolution of the EU as a policy actor in the Iran talks, but to highlight when and how its presence as an actor shifted from having a mediatory capacity to subscribing to a punitive unified 'bloc' position with the US. For the purpose of this article, this is an important conceptual first step in analysing the intertwining of the forces of consent and coercion in the US-EU dialogue on Iran.
Under the E3's negotiation efforts, nuclear talks seemed to have been making American bloc that Iran posed a threat to world peace" (Mousavian, 2012: 152) . The E3's diplomatic initiative deserves credit for laying out conditions for diplomatic compromises that would later serve as a basis for negotiations in the extended E3+3
format (Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014: 16) . The US position at the time uncompromisingly insisted on the complete dismantling of Iranian nuclear facilities and 'zero enrichment' (Patrikarakos, 2012: 197) . In this early phase of nuclear diplomacy, at least until the November 2004 agreement, the Europeans' negotiating credibility lay in their potential to block the Americans from pushing the case to be referred to the Security Council and in serving as a 'human shield' against possible American or Israeli unilateral attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities (Porter, 2014: 141; Mousavian, 2012: 103 (Taylor, 2010: 75-77 Thus confronted with a 'Western' bloc position of pressure, the Ahmadinejad administration put more emphasis on its policy of 'looking to the East' in order to diversify Iranian trade relations so as to better resist US pressure (Mousavian, 2012: 190f. (Pieper, 2014) . In their analysis of the approaches of 'rising powers' to non-proliferation sanctions, Biersteker and Moret (2015) find ambivalence in the positions of Russia and China, but also of other 'emerging' powers such as India, Brazil, Turkey and Indonesia: While they have not systematically opposed the adoption of UN sanctions, they have criticized their intrusive nature, but have supported them on some occasions (see also Pieper, 2017) . This finding reinforces the idea in Gramscian
Thought that the positions within a prevalent historic bloc, its subalterns and counterhegemonic forces are reacting to each other and are thus constantly subject to change and re-negotiation (Jones, 2006: 79) . It is at this point of re-negotiation of policies that counter-hegemonic movements have their biggest leverage. 'New powers', however, rarely articulate radical alternatives to existing orders (Narlikar, 2013: 575) . Historic blocs change gradually, subject to socialization and the framing of particular demands.
In this process, Narlikar singles out the EU and the US as 'gatekeepers to the inner sanctums of international regimes', as 'the chief established powers of today' (Narlikar, 2013: 563) . Diverging positions between the US and the EU administrations in the early years of nuclear diplomacy with Iran therefore gave Tehran ample opportunities to 'exploit the gap between Europe and the United States to achieve Iranian objectives', as
Mousavian (2012: 180) Gramsci calls a 'hegemonic bloc', powerful actors mould a consensual order that is based on the interacting forces of consent and coercion (Gramsci, 1971: 55-60; 415-25; Cox, 1996: 131) . Coercion alone cannot sustain such a 'hegemonic bloc', but has to be remains unmatched in its potential to influence other actors through such hegemonic structures (cf. also Wilkinson, 1999: 142; Krahmann, 2005: 533; Wicht, 2002: 77; Hart & Jones, 2011; Quinn, 2011; Stokes, 2014; Cox, 2001; . The ISA has been adopted for non-proliferation and anti-terrorism reasons, which possibly complicates its general termination. 12 As economic sanctions, these are coercive measures. Coercion thus does not necessarily only mean physical transgressions in the form of military action, but also entails the intrusion into the conduct of economic relations of sovereign countries. In a Gramscian understanding, such an intrusive behavior is part and parcel of hegemonic strategy, because 'hegemony
[is] protected by the armour of coercion' (Gramsci, 1971: 263) . The Helms-Burton and D'Amato-Kennedy Acts, upon which CISADA was modelled, have been considered unlawful under international law (Dupont, 2012: 4; Lowe, 1997 ).
Yet, in order to pre-empt formal counter-action by EU member states in the WTO, the US government seemed to have found a modus operandi over the application of the ILSA. To this effect, it is worth quoting at length from Kenneth Katzman's Since 2010, however, US president Obama has enforced US unilateral sanctions also against European companies by way of executive orders (Lohmann, 2015) . This aspect of extraterritoriality is unique to US unilateral sanctions. EU sanctions affect bilateral interactions with the sanctioned entity, but stop short of punishing third entities. (Nirumand, 2015: 18) . The nuclear agreement, she let it be known, is not the end, but the beginning of a new chapter in EU-Iran relations. With sanctions lifted, Iran would be able to increase the production and export of oil. This is a prospect that European actors are exploring with interest: The rapid deterioration in relations between Russia and the EU in the course of the Ukraine crisis has sped up Europe's efforts to diversify its energy sources away from Russia (European Commission, 2015; ECFR, 2015) . But also Russia is seeking to diversify its oil and gas customers and increasingly seeks to export LNG to the Asian market (Westphal, 2014) .
While the prospect of Iran becoming an important energy supplier for Europe is still unclear, it cannot be excluded that political dynamics have the potential to shake Russia's position on the European energy market and hasten European ambitions to develop closer energy ties to Iran (cf. also Sasnal & Secrieru, 2015) .
With a deal negotiated, commercial incentives can create a path dependency that makes the re-imposition of sanctions in case of Iranian violation of the agreement more unlikely despite the 'snapback' mechanism foreseen under the JCPOA. In a historical institutionalist perspective, unintended consequences reduce policy leeway (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 952) . The lifting of Iran sanctions reverses this logic: The intended consequences of the JCPOA ('new chapter in relations with Iran') reduce the leeway of governments to re-impose sanctions. The complex web of sanctions woven by US administrations, however, means that the lifting of US nuclear-related sanctions will not affect sanctions that were imposed over human rights violations and terrorism charges.
It was this expectation that Ayatollah Khamenei hinted at in his statement endorsing the nuclear agreement. In it, he demanded that all 'economic and financial sanctions' on the part of the US and the EU be lifted if Iran meets its terms of the agreement (Erdbrink 2015) . The US, however, will retain secondary sanctions targeting third parties 'for dealings with Iranian persons on our SDN list, including those designated under our terrorism, counter-proliferation, missile, and human rights authorities.' Such parties would 'put themselves at risk of being cut off from the U.S. financial system. This includes foreign financial institutions, who would risk losing their correspondent account with U.S. banks ' (White House, 2015) . Complicating matters for companies eager to invest in Iran is the extent to which Iranian companies control relevant parts of the economy that will continue to fall into the above categories. Examples here are banks listed for carrying out terrorism-related transactions; construction, trading and transport companies tied to the IRGC; or telecommunication companies (Kagan, 2015) . with Iran after the nuclear deal could 'eventually facilitate the creation of an inclusive security governance structure in the Gulf', as Riccardo Alcaro formulates (2015: 3; see also Alcaro, 2013: 94) . Officially, however, all state parties to the nuclear agreement continue to uphold the policy of separating other policy domains from the nuclear dossier (Barzegar, 2014: 5) . The implementation of the JCPOA is therefore a long-term process. Until 2025, Iran will be subject to a special monitoring and inspection regime and only then be treated as any other non-nuclear weapon state ( capacities that would free up resources for a more comprehensive and strategic policy planning on Iran beyond the technical nuclear file (Adebahr, 2015b; Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014: 20) . However, with the applicability of US financial sanctions exercising a structural force that national European governments hardly have instruments to circumvent, it will remain a major quasi-ideological question how cooperation with Iran can take shape as the nuclear agreement will be gradually implemented. Kempin & Mawdsley, 2013: 56) . It would also require a critical examination of the 'sanctions paradox' according to which policymakers continue to invoke such instruments despite questionable effects on 'target' actors (Taylor, 2010: 16) . Taylor Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008: 113) ; Bretherton & Vogler (2006: 183) ; Kile (2005) ; Ansari (2006: 202f.) ; Barzegar (2012: 255f.) ; Patrikarakos (2012: 195-225) ; Mousavian (2012); Chirac (2011: 300) . 5 Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (2012) recounts in his memoirs how in this early phase of negotiations over nuclear Iran, the US was highly suspicious of not only the Iranians, but also of the Europeans' approach (405; 448; 453) . Tellingly, former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (2011) calls E3 diplomacy with Iran a 'disaster' in his memoirs (639). And former Iranian nuclear spokesperson Mousavian (2014) suspected US behind-the-scene activities in the E3' lack of flexibility in 2003-2005 (202-206) . 6 The measures included restrictions on trade and investment in the Iranian insurance, banking, transportation and energy sector. 7 EU unilateral sanctions have been applied to more sectors, including non-proliferation, and moved from 'targeted' to arguably comprehensive sanctions approaches. Yet, the intended effects and likely impact of EU sanctions lacks both public and governmental scrutiny (as admitted by government officials. EU sanctions workshop, 14 May 2015, London.). Cf. also Portela (2010) .
